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THE USE OF RISK THEORY IN FRAMING
SOLVENCY CONTROLS FOR NONLIFE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
-MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN t
Regulatory proceedings frequently lead to decisions expressed in
quantitative terms although both the controlling legal standard and key
elements in the supporting evidence are expressed only in qualitative
terms. Determining the percentage "fair rate of return" for a public
utility is a prime example. No mathematical formula for arriving at the
fair rate has yet gained acceptance, and the commissions, not surpris-
ingly, have not explained how their quantitative conclusions follow from
the qualitative evidence offered in rate proceedings. In fact, the rate
decisions rest on unexplainable intuitive judgments.
In recent years, efforts have been made to circumscribe the role
of subjective judgment in some regulatory proceedings by introducing
objective methods utilizing mathematical techniques.' The theory of
these efforts has not been to eliminate subjective judgment from regu-
lation but to drive it back from the ultimate decision into preliminary
questions where traditional methods of legal analysis seem more rational
because they are not called upon to produce numerical results.
For example, a utility entitled to earn the same rate of return as
other enterprises of commensurate risk may be awarded a rate repre-
senting a subjective evaluation of the difference in risk between the
enterprise being regulated and those used as standards.' But if risk
is equated with variability in earnings, statistical methods can be used
to relate risk and rate of return on an objective basis.' In the first or
traditional method the key decisions are the subjective evaluation of
differences in risk and their use to produce different rates of return.
t Lecturer in Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1955, J.D. 1958, Harvard Uni-
versity. Member, New York Bar.
The author is indebted to William B. Fairley and George H. Heyman for their
respective contributions to this project. Insurance officials in Finland and the United
States were generous in providing material. In particular, I would like to thank
Kalevi Loimaranta of the Statistical Center for Nonlife Insurance in Helsinki; Dr.
Errki Pesonen, Director of the Department of Insurance of the Finnish Ministry for
Social Affairs; and William Gould of the New York State Department of Insurance.
This article is concerned solely with stock companies, which dominate the industry.
Mutual companies are subject to different rules and present somewhat different
problems.
'See, e.g., it re A.T. & T., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 66-67 (1967); Southern Louisiana
Area Rates, 40 F.P.C. 703: 847-72 (1966) (presiding examiner's decision).
2 See Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation
of Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989, 999-1001 (1965).
3For an application of this method, see Western Union Exhibit No. 3, The
Western Union Telegraph Co., No. 18270 (F.C.C. Oct. 2, 1968).
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In the second or "mathematical" method the key decision is the accept-
ance of variability in earnings as a fair surrogate for risk; the rest
follows swiftly. It is the implicit premise of the mathematical model
builders that the first method will inevitably involve unexplained acts of
faith which foreclose progress toward greater correctness, while the
second method may be explained, argued, and refined.
Mathematical models have received fairly wide acceptance in the
social sciences and in some areas of business planning, but despite re-
peated efforts they have yet to influence in a significant way either the
form or content of regulation in this country. In adversary proceedings,
a determined and well-financed opponent can usually raise a cloud of
objections sufficient to persuade the decisionmaker to avoid reliance on
an imperfectly understood and potentially defective technique.4 Cross-
examination or rebuttal testimony of this type is less difficult to
assemble than one might think because mathematical formulation always
requires simplification of the real situation and is thus forever open to
the charge that some vital element has been omitted. The evolution
of more sophisticated models will not eliminate these points of attack,
but promises to focus attention on the legal standards by which the
mathematics are to be judged.' Indeed, the ultimate problems of adapt-
ing mathematical theory to regulatory practice are more likely to be
legal than scientific.
The gap between mathematical theory and regulatory practice is
probably nowhere more significant than in the field of insurance, where
a prime purpose of regulation is protection of solvency. A vast
mathematical literature on the theoretical aspects of solvency control
has developed in the past fifty years, but insurance authorities in the
United States have remained impervious to its teachings, and solvency
controls continue to be set by a generalized appeal to experience and
intuition. This state of innocence may have significant social conse-
quences. In addition to protecting the public from insurance company
failure, solvency controls influence both the degree of competition and
the extent to which insured risks are redistributed by reinsurance with
other insurers in the nonlife insurance industry. If the current high
levels of required minimum capital and reserves were reduced, new
companies with less extensive resources would be encouraged as to
both entry and growth and might prove more aggressive as competitors
than established firms. A reduction in required reserves would also
4 See, e.g., In re A.T. & T., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 68, 87 (1967); Southern Louisiana
Area Rates, 40 F.P.C. 703, 858-72 (1966).
5 Experts have already disagreed on the standards question. Compare the re-
quirements stated in Bell Exhibit No. 41 (statement of John W. Tukey) with those
in F.C.C. Staff Exhibit No. 34 (statement of G. West Churchman), It re A.T. & T.,
9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967).
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diminish the extent to which companies have to minimize their risks
by passing them on to others through reinsurance. Conversely, the
correctness of solvency controls grows in importance as the industry
becomes more competitive and the margin for error shrinks. Minimum
reserve rules will also effect the extent to which a company has free
surplus to use in different lines of business, to distribute to stockholders,
or to pledge for borrowings. The stringency of controls will thus
influence not only dividends but also the growth of insurance holding
companies and conglomerates.
In Finland, insurance authorities have drawn on the mathematical
theory of solvency control in creating their regulations. Beginning in
1952, the Finnish Department of Insurance, concerned that inflation
might be eroding company solvency, began to evolve minimum capital
and reserve rules based on sophisticated mathematical techniques
drawn from the branch of mathematical probability known as risk
theory.' Under this theory, the total amount of claims against an
insurance company becomes a variable which may, with determinable
probabilities, assume different values instead of being a set quantity
as in classical actuarial science. The future financial position of a
company is thus estimated on a probabilistic basis from mathematical
models for distributions of numbers and sizes of claims, an approach
which is needed for nonlife companies because total claim amounts
fluctuate from year to year.' Risk theoretic methods articulate the
variables relevant to solvency and the interrelationships among various
types of controls, and furnish an estimate of the degree of risk entailed
in any particular choice. Of course, solvency controls cannot be deter-
mined on a purely technical basis. Determination of the level of risk or
danger of insolvency which is acceptable requires a weighing of the
risks of insolvency against the anticompetitive effects of high reserve
requirements and controls on premiums. In making this policy judg-
ment, however, technical methods are useful because the risk side of the
policy equation cannot be appraised without them.
This Article will examine the evolution of the Finnish solvency
controls and compare them with the rules used in New York State, the
single most important American insurance regulatory jurisdiction. The
Finnish methods are instructive because they suggest that the intuitive
controls used in the United States could be relaxed, without endanger-
ing solvency, to promote competition among domestic companies and
6 There is a huge literature on risk theory. The most readable current book is
R. BEARD, T. PENTryIAiNEN & E. PESONEiN, RISK THEORY (1969), which also contains
a good bibliography.
7 Risk theoretic techniques are not needed for life insurance because the force of
mortality is relatively constant and predictable.
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to eliminate unnecessary reinsurance costs, thereby permitting reduc-
tions in premium rates. Reduction in reinsurance would also reduce
or eliminate a United States dollar drain caused by payments of re-
insurance premiums abroad. Apart from its immediate application to
insurance, the Finnish method is worth understanding because it is
probably the first successful effort to fuse sophisticated mathematical
theory and practice in a regulatory process.
I. THE NEW YORK RULES
Protection against insurance company insolvency begins with
statutory requirements for minimum initial surplus and capital. In the
United States, statutes usually prescribe fixed dollar amounts for mini-
mum paid-in capital which must be maintained at all times, and separate
requirements for initial surplus, which may be expended. New York
has the highest and most elaborate minimum capital requirements of
any state, and since its statute applies to any insurance company doing
business in New York I it has broad extraterritorial reach.
The theory underlying the New York statute is that separate, fixed
amounts of minimum capital should be required for each line of insur-
ance and that additional initial surplus should equal fifty or one hundred
percent of this minimum capital.' The amounts currently required in
New York are essentially unchanged from the 1939 revision of the
insurance law. At that time they were almost doubled at the behest
of the Department of Insurance, reflecting, it was said, the experience
of the depression.'" Today, a New York stock casualty company 1 '
s N.Y. INs. LAW § 40 (McKinney 1966).
9 Capital, for present purposes, is defined as "the aggregate par value of all classes
of shares of capital stock issued and outstanding." N.Y. INs. LAW § 4(8) (McKinney
1966). Additionally required "initial surplus" is defined merely as an amount at least
equal to a specified percentage of minimum paid-in capital: 50% for the kinds of
business set forth in § 311 and 100% for the kinds set forth in § 341 (fire and marine).
Id. §§ 311(1), 341(1).
The kinds of insurance authorized in New York are divided into 23 classifications,
id. § 46, and requirements for minimum paid-in capital are established separately for
each kind of insurance. See id. §§311(1) (a)-(e), (i), 341(1). When a company
engages in more than one line of insurance business the requirements are cumulative,
though mitigated by (1), for some classes, a flat $50,000 reduction in minimum capital
for each class except the first, id. § 311 (1) (f), and (2) overlapping requirements for
fire, marine, and associated insurance, id. § 341.
10 The capital requirements for casualty insurance and surety companies
have been substantially increased. This has been done by subdividing the
insuring powers with regard to the amount of captial deemed requisite for
the particular power. Due consideration has been given to the experiences
of the recent depression and to the records of the Liquidation Bureau of the
Insurance Department.
N.Y. STATE INs. DEP'T, IhsURANcE LAW REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
TENTATIVE DRAFT 1937 ix. The provisions of the Tentative Draft were adopted in
1939 virtually without change and have since been amended principally to reflect the
allowance of multiple-line powers.
11 A stock casualty insurance company is a company organized as a stock insur-
ance company, N.Y. INs. LAw § 48, and given power to do any of the kinds of business
incorporated in § 310 by reference to § 46.
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desiring to write all types of casualty and surety business must have a
total minimum paid-in capital and initial surplus: 2 of $2,700,000,"
$1,800,000 of which must be maintained. 4 If fire and marine lines
are added, total minimum paid-in capital and initial surplus rises by
$1,000,000, and minimum capital that must be maintained rises by
$500,000, subject to certain minor adjustments.'5 A company engaged
in all permitted lines of casualty, surety, fire and marine insurance
would thus need total minimum paid-in capital and initial surplus of
$3,550,000, of which $2,200,000 must be maintained.'"
These requirements are supplemented by a statutory rule limiting
the size of any single risk and by administrative guides against which
unimpaired reserves are tested annually on the basis of statements filed
with the New York Insurance Department. The statutory rule provides
that a company's maximum single net retained risk '7 may not exceed ten
percent of its policyholders' surplus.' 8 As we shall see, this is a critical
element in the pattern of controls, although it has never attracted much
12 The required amount of capital and surplus, see note 9 supra, must have been
paid in to the company before a license to do any business may issue. Id. § 48(8) (2).
'.3 See id. §311(1). A calculation deriving this result may be found in N.Y.
STATE INS. DEP'T, 2 EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 75 (1953) (table 2).
The statutes of other states are in general form similar to those of New York.
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 700.01, 700.02 (West Supp. 1971) (Minimum paid-in
capital is the lesser of $1 million or the aggregate of a schedule of amounts ranging
from $50,000 to $250,000 each for designated classes of insurance; surplus must equal
50% of minimum capital for insurers in business more than five years and 100% for
others.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 625 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) (Minimum paid-up
capital is $400,000 for fire and marine companies and either $400,000 or $600,000 for
casualty companies, depending on whether more than one type of casualty business is
authorized; initial surplus is 50% of minimum capital for new companies while
permanent surplus is required only for vehicle insurance.) ; PA. STAT. tit. 40, § 386
(Supp. 1971) (Minimum paid-up capital is $100,000 to $300,000 for fire and marine
companies depending on the range of activities, $100,000 to $300,000 for casualty
companies, depending on the range of activities, with certain exceptions for which
higher amounts are required. A casualty company may transact all types of business
with $1,200,000. Minimum paid-in surplus is 50%' of the subscribed total stock.);
TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 2.02(4) (1963) (minimum paid-in capital of $100,000 and
surplus of $50,000 for fire and marine insurers; $150,000 capital and $75,000 surplus
for fidelity and casualty insurance; $200,000 capital and $100,000 surplus for all
classes combined).
14 See N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, 2 EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 75
(1953) (table 2).
'5 See N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 311, 341 (McKinney 1966) ; note 9 supra.
'6 This calculation may be found in N.Y. STATE INS. DE'T, 2 EXAMINATION OF
INSURANCE COMPANIES 77 (1953) (table 5).
17" N.Y. INs. LAW § 47 (McKinney 1966). Risks may be passed on or "reinsured"
with an "assuming insurer." Id. § 77. A risk or portion thereof which is reinsured
is deducted before the 10% limitation is applied. Id. § 47.
'8 Id. § 47. "Surplus to policyholders" is a term keyed to the ongoing liquidity
of the company's reserves and is thus to be distinguished from initial surplus. While
initial surplus refers only to initially required funds in excess of minimum capital,
"surplus to policyholders" is defined as the excess of "admitted" or qualifying assets,
see id. § 70, over the liabilities of the company. Id. § 4(34). This is alternatively
defined as "the sum of all capital and surplus accounts minus any impairment thereof."
Id. For purposes of determining the maximum allowable risk, surplus to policyholders
explicitly includes "any voluntary reserves." Id. § 47(a).
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attention, and was carried forward from the 1939 law without change
or discussion. The basic administrative guide is an unwritten two-to-
one rule to the effect that net written premiums (written premiums re-
maining after deduction of premiums paid to reinsurers) in all lines
of insurance except fire and marine insurance may not exceed twice
policyholders' surplus. 9 Put another way, the New York Insurance
Department requires a minimum policyholders' surplus equal to fifty
percent of net written premiums. For fire and marine insurance a
special one-to-one rule requires a surplus equal to 100 percent of written
premiums, reflecting the possibility of greater claim fluctuations in
claims in these lines. In describing these rules, the Department stresses
that these limitations are only benchmarks and that higher multiples are
permitted if a company has shown a history of profitable underwritings. °
The two-to-one and one-to-one administrative guides were based
on the observation of a former New York Commissioner of Insurance
that companies with greater ratios tended to get into trouble during the
1930's and that the companies themselves have since followed these
rules.2 A statutory requirement to this effect was included in a draft
of the 1939 recodification of the New York Insurance Law as a re-
striction on dividend payments but was deleted to avoid controversy.
22
The insurance law currently provides that aggregate dividends within
any tvelve-month period may not exceed ten percent of surplus to
policyholders or 100 percent of investment income (whichever is
greater) unless the Superintendent has previously found that the insurer
will retain sufficient surplus to support its obligations and writings. 3
This limitation may usefully identify questionable distributions but does
not, in itself, constitute a substantive control since smaller distributions
may imperil solvency, and the statute does not specify which larger ones
involve peril.
Insurance regulators in the United States have generally accepted
this arrangement: statutory minimum capital requirements are fixed
dollar amounts and administrative controls are multiples of net written
19 See N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE
HOLDING COmPANIES 46 (1968).
2 0 Interview with William Gould, Neew York State Insurance Commissioner,
June 1971.
21 See N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE
HOLDING COMPANIES 46 (1968).
22 Section 91.5 of the Tentative Draft of 1937 provided that a stock company could
not pay a cash dividend unless its surplus to policyholders after the payment would be
at least 507o of its net premiums written during the preceding year. The Depart-
ment's comment on this provision was that, "[t]he limitations placed upon such
companies in this section are no more severe than those observed by the more con-
servative casualty and surety companies." N.Y. STATE INs. DEP'T, INSURANCE LAW
REvisION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, TENTATrVE DAFT 1937, at 291.
23 See N.Y. INS. LAW §§313 (casualty and surety companies), 343 (fire and
marine insurance companies) (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
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premiums. Discussion of the rules has focused on the amounts of
minimum capital and the multiple of net written premiums. Within
the past five years, a number of states have amended their statutes to
increase minimum required capital and policyholders' surplus, thus
bringing their requirements closer to those of New York. 4 On the
other hand, New York's two-to-one rule has been criticized as "surely
too stringent when used as a test of solidity," '- and the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners is reported to consider three-to-one
a conservative ratio.2
Calculations developed below will show that New York's statutory
minimum capital and reserve rules may impose an unnecessary burden
on the industry to the particular detriment of smaller companies. It
appears, however, that the defects in the present system will not best be
cured simply by changing the specified amounts of minimum capital or
the multiple of net written premiums used to test reserves. To gauge
the need for the reserves currently required in the United States, and
as a source for rules incorporating factors more relevant to solvency,
the next section examines the controls used in Finland.
II. THE FINNISH RULES
When a new insurance companies law was enacted in Finland in
1952, the Department of Insurance was headed by Dr. Teivo
Pentikiinen, a mathematician who had written some basic papers on
applications of risk theory. Dr. Pentik~iinen and others persuaded the
Finnish government to accept risk theoretic considerations in framing
statutory minimum capital rules and to write into the law express
authority to use risk theory in connection with the equalization re-
serve.2 7 The role of these methods expanded in 1965 when the Depart-
ment of Insurance, under Dr. Erkki Pesonen (also a mathematician),
refined some of the earlier techniques and established new rules for
judging insurance company solvency.
A. Statutory Minimum Capital
The derivation of the Finnish statutory minimum capital rule
begins with the principle that minimum capital should be large enough
to leave only a small specified probability (on the order of 0.01 or less)
that claims against a company would exceed the total of net premium
24 See Hearings on the Iburance Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the JAidiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15,
at 9026-27 (1969) (testimony of D. Pack).
25 N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE
HOLDING COMPANIES 46 (1968).
:26 M. Kaplan, Regulation for Insolvency in Hearings on the Insutrance Industry
Before the Subcomin. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Jidiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 8962, 8966 (1969).
27 See text accompanying note 52 infra.
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income and working capital.2 Since net premium income (that is,
net earned " premiums less administrative expenses) is computed to
cover expected claims, the function of working capital is to supply a
reserve against years in which losses exceed the amounts expected.
The amount of working capital needed to cover, within any speci-
fied degree of risk, claims in excess of those expected requires complex
calculations which depend on the number and sizes of the policies in a
company's portfolio. For purposes of a statutory minimum capital
rule it is necessary to make simplifying assumptions. The Finnish
Supervisory Service assumed that net premium income was just ade-
quate to cover expected losses; it thus assumed no profit. If, however,
minimum capital requirements were simply based directly on net
premium income, a company could always meet the statutory standards
by increasing its reinsurance, since net premium income excludes
premiums paid to reinsurers. To prevent this practice-which might
tempt undercapitalized companies to carry excessive reinsurance-the
Finnish statutory rule assumes that net premium income is one-half
gross earned premiums.30
The degree to which actual claims may exceed expected claims is
expressed in terms of the standard deviation, which is a measure of the
spread or dispersion of a random variable about its mean or expected
value. 1 Thus, if the total amount claimed is normally distributed,"
there is a 0.01 chance that it will be more than 2.3 standard deviations
8 The description in the text of the derivation of the rules contained in § 5 of the
Finnish Insurance Companies Act of 1952 draws principally on an unpublished, undated
memorandum of the Finnish Department of Insurance entitled, A Short Summary
Concerning the System of Security Margin, Stabilization Reserve and Net Retention
Applied by the Finnish Supervisory Office.
29 Earned premiums rather than written premiums reflect the risks carried. See
text following note 89 infra.
30 Finnish Dep't of Insurance, A Short Summary Concerning the System of
Security Margin, Stabilization Reserve and Net Retention Applied by the Finnish
Supervisory Office 2. In marine insurance and received reinsurance, where the need
for reinsurance is greater than in other lines, calculations are based on the premium
after deducting the reinsurer's share. There is, however, a proviso that this premium
figure after reinsurance shall be at least 50% of the gross figure. Finnish Ins. Com-
panies Act of 1952, § 5(3), translated in 1964 INs. ix FINLAND, No. 2, at 3. The
combined effect of these rules is to permit net premium income for marine and received
reinsurance to be as low as 25% of gross premiums, instead of 507 as in other lines.
31 The standard deviation provides a quantitative measure of the variability of
random variables which may differ even though they have the same expected value
(mean). For example, assume the expected amount of claims against an insurer
is $500 in a given year. This could mean that in most years there will be between
$400 and $600 in claims. Alternatively, it could mean that some years are very
good for the company and result in $200 or less in claims and that other years are
very bad and result in over $800 in claims. The latter case would require more
stringent solvency controls. The standard deviation, as defined above, distinguishes
between these situations. The standard deviation squared (the variance) is defined
as the expected value of the square of the difference between the variable and its
mean value.
2 For a discussion of the validity of assuming a normal distribution, see note 38
infra.
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above the expected amount, 3 and only a 0.0001 chance that the de-
parture will be more than 3.7 standard deviations above the expected
amount. 4 In the present context, the standard deviation can be shown
to be approximately equal to V'KpM, where p is the total net earned
premiums and M is the maximum realistically possible single claim. K
is a factor reflecting the variation in amounts claimed under individual
policies, which increases as this variation diminishes and equals a
maximum of 1.0 when individual claims are all equal to the maximum.'
Based on empirical studies of variations in claims, it was known that
K usually ranges between 0.2 and 0.6.6 Since larger values of K lead
to larger capital requirements, the Supervisory Service had reason to
believe it was acting conservatively in setting K equal to 0.67.
Using these assumptions, minimum capital, U, may be written as
(1) U =yJM
where y is the number of standard deviation units from the expected
claim amount sufficient to secure whatever degree of safety is required
as a matter of policy, and N/0-.67pMll is the standard deviation.3 7  The
Supervisory Service decided that a risk of insolvency of 0.0001 would
be permitted, which, assuming the total amount of claims to be normally
distributed,38 is equivalent to 3.7 standard deviations.39 Thus y was
set equal to 3.7, p was assumed equal to one-half gross earned premiums
for the reasons already given,40 and 14t was estimated at one percent of
33 1 W. FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITs APPLICA-
TIONS 167 (2d ed. 1957).
34Id.
35See R. BEARD, T. PENTIKXINEN & E. PESONEN, RisK THEORY 58 (1969). On
the assumption that claims occur randomly and independently, the standard deviation
of total claims amount is V-ii where a is the second moment of the distribution of
individual claim amounts and n is the expected number of claims. For a derivation,
see id. 22-23.
a2
Setting p = rn where in is the mean amount of a single 
claim, and K= -
Inm
yields the result given in the text. Id. 58-59.
36 Id. 58.
S The total resource of a company with which to pay claims is U + p, where U
is the working capital and p is the net premium income. Since p must equal the
expected amount of claims, U must be an additional amount large enough to cover
claim fluctuations within the specified degree of safety. Thus U + p =P + y V O.67pM
or U=yVO.67pM as stated in the text.
38 There is a theoretical warrant for this assumption because the total amount of
claims against a company is the sum of many small independent claims and the central
limit theorem of probability theory states that the sum of a large number of inde-
pendent random variables will be approximately normally distributed regardless of
their individual distributions. See, e.g., P. FREUND, MATHEimATICAL STATIsTIcs 185
(1962). In fact, however, the choice of a normal distribution is not conservative
because it understates the probability of large claims. This assumption was not used
by the Supervisory Service in its subsequent development of more detailed reserve
rules.
39 1 W. FELLER, supra note 33, at 167.
4 0 Text accompanying note 30 sipra.
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gross earned premiums. When these values are inserted in equation
(1) above, minimum capital equals about twenty percent of gross
earned premiums. This formulation assumes, however, that M in-
creases in a linear fashion with gross premiums, an overstatement
which causes capital requirements to rise too steeply as business in-
creases. To correct this, a separate segment was added: the additions
to capital for gross earned premiums over Fmk 4 million 41 are at the
rate of ten percent instead of twenty percent of gross earned premiums.'
This rule does not consider the costs of starting or winding up a
company. For these purposes, the Finnish act requires a fixed initial
capital, which may be expended, and a fixed permanent working capital
in addition to the amount determined on the basis of gross premiums.
An insurance company is entitled to a license to do business if it has
initial capital of at least Fmk 1 million ($238,100) for fire and marine
insurance, or at least Fmk 500,000 ($119,050) for other kinds of
nonlife insurance.4  The issuance of a license is discretionary if initial
capital is at least half the amounts specified.44 The fixed part of the
permanent working capital is Fmk 200,000 ($47,620) which covers
all types of nonlife insurance. Thus the current rule is that fixed
minimum working capital must equal Fmk 200,000 plus about twenty
percent of average gross earned premiums over the preceding three
years up to Fmk 4 million and ten percent on average gross earned
premiums in excess of this amount.4 A similar rule is the law in
England.46
41 The Finnish mark (Fmk) currently converts at about 42 to the dollar. 1 THE
EUROPA YEnu0ooic 1970, at 616.
42 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 5, translated in 1964 INs. IN FINIA .D,
No. 2, at 2-3. The amount was recently raised to Fink 4 million to account for
inflation. See Letter from Erkki Pesonen to Michael 0. Finkelstein, Nov. 3, 1970. If
M were assumed to equal 107'% of surplus, the legal maximum in New York, but the
assumptions of the Finnish method were otherwise accepted, the minimum capital
required would be 45% of gross premiums-close to New York's administrative
two-to-one rule.
43 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, §4, translated in 1964 Ixs. IN FNLAND,
No. 2, at 2. These figures include recent increases to account for inflation. See
Letter from Erkki Pesonen to Michael 0. Finkelstein, Nov. 3, 1970.
44 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 4, translated in 1964 INs. IN FINLAND,
No. 2, at 2.
45
1d. § 5, translated in 1964 INs. nr FINLAND, No. 2, at 2-3. The amount was
recently increased to account for inflation. See Letter from Erkki Pesonen to Michael
0. Finkelstein, Nov. 3, 1970.
To prevent companies from being wound up due to insufficient capital and free
surplus, the Finnish law provides a further cushion: a company whose policyholders'
surplus and reserves are less than twice the required minimum shall transfer each
year to such surplus at least 10% of its business profit. Finnish Ins. Companies Act
of 1952, § 28, translated in 1964 INs. 3w FINLAND, No. 2, at 10.
46 Under English statutes, a nonlife insurer must have a surplus of at least
150,000 if the general premium income of the company in the previous year did not
exceed £250,000, a fifth of that income if it exceeded £250,000 but not f2,500,000, or the
aggregate of £6500,000 and one tenth of the amount by which that income exceeded
£2,500,000. Companies Act 1967, c. 81, § 62(2). Note that the use of a stair step
and the percentages of gross premiums are similar to those of Finnish law.
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Use of the ten percent segment of the rule, which lacks statistical
support, and reliance on approximations instead of calculations for indi-
vidual cases, make it uncertain that all companies will be protected,
within the stated margin of safety, by this capital rule. The choice of
that margin was itself a significant policy decision since the required
reserves would be on the order of fifteen to twenty percent less if a
safety margin based on a ruin probability of 0.001 instead of 0.0001 had
been used. While changes in the approximating assumptions or in the
safety margin would change the parameters of the rule, the significant
fact is that minimum working capital is linked to premium volume, and
the magnitude of the link has been defined by solvency considerations.
Finnish companies are thus required to maintain sufficient surplus to
cover claim fluctuations but are not unnecessarily burdened, as United
States companies are, by minimum capital requirements when premium
volume is small.
B. Administrative Rules
Statutory minimum capital requirements, which provide con-
tinuously applicable, rough limits, are supplemented by administrative
rules against which reserves are tested more precisely at the close of
each year. These rules, based on risk theoretic considerations,47 were
originally introduced in Finland in a context not directly connected with
solvency.
Prior to 1952, because of high corporate tax rates, Finnish insur-
ance companies found it more profitable to pay reinsurance premiums,
which were deductible expenses, than to accumulate reserves from
after-tax dollars. Reinsurance was frequently carried with foreign
companies, and the funds flowing out of Finland had adverse effects on
the balance of payments and were lost for domestic investment. To
encourage retention of funds, the insurance law was amended in 1952
to provide for a new "equalization reserve" as a source of funds for
years when claims exceed the amounts expected.
4
In agreeing to permit tax deductible transfers to the equalization
reserve, the Ministry of Finance insisted that changes in the reserve
follow a definite formula. Accordingly, regulations of the Supervisory
47 General descriptions of the risk theoretic method may be found in Pentikiinen,
Fluctuation Reserve: A Technique to Take Into Account the Fluctuation of the Risk
Business When Calculating the Technical Reserves of Insuranwe Companies, 1970
INs. IN FINLAND, No. 1, at 2; and in Pesonen, Technical Reserves and Solvency,
1965 INs. IN FINA.D, No. 2, at 5. A technical description appears in Porn, A Study
in Risk Theory and Its Application to the Computation of the Fluctuation Reserve
Used in Finland, reprinted from SKANDINAVISK AKTuA5RDsRriFT 1 (1968).48 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 46, translated in 1964 INs. IN FINLAND,
No. 2, at 14.
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Service provide that in years in which the actual amount of incurred
claims exceeds the expected amount, the equalization reserve is de-
creased by that difference, which is treated as income for accounting and
tax purposes. In years in which the actual claims are less than ex-
pected claims, the difference is added to the equalization reserve and
deducted from income.4 The equalization reserve thus acts both to
smooth out variations in taxable income and as a reserve in lieu of
reinsurance to cover fluctuations in claims50
In permitting a tax deduction, the Finnish Ministry of Finance
also insisted that the equalization reserve could not grow indefinitely
without taxation, and exempted it only to the extent it could be regarded
as cover for potential claim liability."- The law authorizing an equali-
zation reserve expressly endorsed a risk theoretic approach to the limit
problem by providing that the reserve would be "calculated according
to risk theory, to provide for years with unusually heavy losses." 52 In
implementing this statute, the Supervisory Service decided that the
equalization reserve would not be excessive as long as there was at
least a 0.01 probability that claims in excess of those expected would
exceed the amount reserved. A supplementary rule, however, provides
that the reserve may grow to at least twice the company's maximum
single net retained risk.53 These rules lead to amounts substantially
larger than those needed to protect solvency because other company
assets available for the payments are not considered. Because other
assets are always available, it is in a sense artificial to view the maximum
permitted reserve as necessary to cover fluctuations in claims, but the
rule does at least put a cap on the equalization reserve.
American companies are currently in a position comparable to
Finnish companies in the pre-1952 era because no tax deduction is
49 See MINISTRY FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS, GE L LET TO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COPAN'IES ON THE BASIS OF THE EQUALIZATION REsERvE 3-5 (May 31, 1965) [here-
inafter cited as GENaAL LETTER].
60 See Porn, mtpra note 47, at 2. New companies initially have a zero reserve.
When the equalization reserve system was introduced, each company was permitted
to establish an initial reserve, principally from a revaluation of surplus and secondarily
by transfers from other technical reserves. As a company grows it needs an absolutely
larger (although proportionately smaller) reserve to cover fluctuations in claims. To
allow for growth, the Supervisory Service permits companies to assign an arbitrary
percentage not exceeding 15% to the amount computed each year as expected claims
in the formula governing changes to the reserve. GENERAL LETTER, supra note 49,
at 3-5. The result is a growth in the reserve at the average rate of the selected per-
centage. This percentage must be fixed in advance and may not be changed without
a demonstration of necessity. Id.
51 See Pesonen, supra note 47, at 7.
522 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 46, translated in 1964 INS. IN FiIAND,
No. 2, at 14. In making the necessary computations, primary consideration must be
given to protecting policyholders. Id. § 70, translated in 1964 INs. nT FINLAND, No. 2,
at 21.
33 GENERAL LETTER, supra note 49, at 3.
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allowed for additions to a reserve for claims not yet incurred.54 Since
much reinsurance is carried abroad-there being a net outflow in 1968
of $98 million from premiums paid by American companies to foreign
companies 5 5-balance of payment considerations suggest that a similar
tax rule might be desirable here.
In 1965, the Supervisory Service refined the calculation of the
maximum limitation."6 More importantly, it extended risk theoretic
techniques to govern determination of total minimum working capital
consistent with solvency. Several considerations led to this step.
First, officials of the Service had been relying on intuitive judgment in
assessing company financial conditions and they believed that impar-
tiality would be furthered by objective rules. Second, the Service had
only six examiners, and the lack of manpower argued for a simpler,
mechanistic method for making the necessary determinations. Third,
risk theoretic rules generate, in effect, an index of financial strength
that can be used for advance warning of financial trouble. The Service
regarded this as important because it is empowered to stop company
operations if solvency is threatened and thus effectively to force a
merger as an alternative to liquidation.
57
The approach adopted was similar in theory to that already de-
scribed in connection with the minimum capital rules.5 The minimum
equalization reserve is that amount which together with the other
working capital of the company and net premium income is large enough
so that there is only a small specified probability that losses will
54 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 831, 832. But see id. § 832(e) (mortgage guaranty
insurance losses resulting from adverse economic cycles).
-55 The dollar drain from these payments has been of sufficient concern for the
Department of Commerce to collect statistics. In 1968, United States insurance com-
panies paid $407.9 million to insurance companies resident abroad and received $170.6
million on reinsurance assumed from abroad. Counting losses recovered from abroad
on ceded reinsurance ($291 million) and losses paid abroad on assumed reinsurance
($151.6 million) there was a net outflow in 1968 of $97.9 million, the highest in the
twenty years since the survey was started. INSURANCE ADvocATE, Nov. 29, 1969, at 5
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce figures).
-50 The principle adopted was that the equalization reserve would not be excessive
if there were a 0.01 probability that claims in excess of those expected would exceed
the reserve at least once in a 5 year period. The assumption is made that during
the 5 years business remains at its current level. The principal component of this
probability is represented by the chance that the reserve will be depleted by a series
of bad years in which losses exceed expectations, the company completely exhausting
its reserve in the fifth year. Because the probability of exhaustion is much greater
in the fifth year, the Service accepts calculation of the 0.01 probability based solely
on the chance of exhaustion in that year. See CENTRAL ASSOCIATiON OF FINNISH
INSURANCE CoMP'ANIs, COMPUTATION OF THE LIMITS OF THE EQUALIZATION REsERVE
9-11 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTATION MANUAL].
57 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 81, translated in 1964 INs. IN FINLAND,
No. 2, at 22.
68 The description in the text is drawn from the GENERAL LETTER, supra note 49,
the COMPUTATION MVIANUAL, supra note 56, and from interviews with Dr. Erkki
Pesonen, Director of the Department of Insurance, and Kalevi Loimaranta, head of
the Statistical Center for Nonlife Insurance.
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exceed total reserves and net premium income in the coming year.
A supplemental restriction requires reserves at least equal to the maxi-
mum single risk retained by the company. This prohibits the writing
of a single policy larger than total reserves regardless of the likelihood
of a claim under such a policy.
C. Safe Bound Computations
An exact computation of the reserves required by the theoretical
statement of the objectives of these rules would not be simple. Most
Finnish companies, however, find that their reserves are within au-
thorized safe approximations (safe bound computations) for the mini-
mum and maximum, which are extremely simple to compute, and thus
are spared the more complicated computation. 9 For purposes of these
computations, premiums in the various lines of insurance are aggregated
and treated as a single line.
The approximation for minimum required reserves is computed
using a hypothetical company for which individual claims vary in
number as in the normal case but are all equal in size to the largest
realistically possible claim against the real company. The expected
number of claims against the hypothetical company is deemed to be
sufficiently smaller so that the expected total against the hypothetical
company equals the expected total against the real company. The
Supervisory Service assumes that the hypothetical company, which is
subject to much larger but fewer claims, has a greater probability of
being required to pay any given integral multiple of the maximum net
retained risk than the real company. For this reason, the approximation
is regarded as "safe." 10 While this assumption has been rigorously
proved only for a special case, it appears true for all realistic situations,0 1
and the Service acts on that assumption. Use of the maximum net re-
tained risk is as a practical matter an appropriate solvency control be-
cause companies frequently extend themselves in competing for the
largest policies. Since under the Finnish solvency rules the maximum
net retained risk is already taken into account in computing the required
reserves, there is no need for a special limitation as under New York
law. Accordingly, section 6 of the Finnish act simply provides:
69 A technical description of the safe bound method appears in Pesonen, Magnitude
Control of Technical Reserves in Finland, 4 THE AsTiN BULLET N 248, 250 (1967).
60 To avoid the possibility that the rough step function form of the distribution
of the total claims amount for the hypothetical company should cause a miss of the
last catrastrophic claim, an amount equal to one claim of the stated constant size is
added to the final result. Porn, supra note 47, at 2 (equation 1'); COmPUTATION
MANUAL, supra note 56, at 8.
6 1 Porn, supra note 47, at 15.
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The insurance company shall, by reinsurance or in some
other way, carry on its business in such a manner that the
interests of the insured are safeguarded by a sound relation-
ship between the probable fluctuation of the company's loss
costs and its working capital.'
The expected amount of claims is computed from the average loss
ratio (incurred losses to earned premuims) for at least the five preced-
ing years multiplied by earned premiums in the year just closed. The
expected number of claims against the hypothetical company in the
next year is computed by dividing the amount of expected claims in the
year just closed by the maximum realistically possible single claim. If
a trend in losses or premiums is noticed in any line of insurance, its
influence may be taken into account by linear projections from the data
of up to five preceding years.
6 3
Claims in excess of those expected may be viewed as arising in
two ways. First, the basic probabilities associated with the risk may
increase due to some temporary change in conditions or as part of a
long-term trend. Thus an exceptionally dry summer will create a
heightened risk of fire and change for a time the basic probabilities
associated with that risk. Second, changes may arise from simple
random fluctuation in the number and amount of claims. In formulat-
ing the statutory minimum capital rule, the Service in effect took both
classes of risk into account simply by requiring a safety factor of 0.0001.
In its administrative rules, these risks are considered separately. "Bad
years" are accounted for by multiplying expected claims by a factor
intended to increase those amounts to the level of a bad year. The
factors required by the Supervisory Service are for the most part
between twenty and forty percent, depending on the class of insurance.64
They were determined by examining variations in claims statistics for
the various lines of insurance over a period of years, excluding ex-
tremely abnormal situations such as those produced by major depres-
sions or war, and determining the proportion of the variation which
could not within a 0.01 probability be attributed to chance fluctuations
and so might be said to represent a change in the basic probabilities.
The Supervisory Service believes the present estimates are somewhat
overstated and intends to revise them as further data accumulate. Even
though firm conclusions as to the proper magnitudes of these factors
62 Finnish Ins. Companies Act of 1952, § 6, translated in 1964 INs. ix FINLAND,
No. 2, at 3.
63 COmPUTATION M NuAL, supra note 56, at 19.
6 4 GENRAL L=rxE, supra note 49 (appendix 2). For example, liability insurance
has a 0.20 factor, fire insurance a 0.40 factor, and forest insurance is in a class by
itself with a 6.00 factor. After applying these factors to net premium income for
each line, the amounts are aggregated and treated as a single line. Id.
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are not yet possible, their use protects against trouble for a large number
of companies in a bad year which would make rescue operations by
merger extremely difficult, particularly in a small country such as
Finland.
Random fluctuations are those variations that would occur even
assuming basic probabilities remained unchanged. Protection against
such variations is provided by estimating from the expected total amount
of claims (strengthened as previously described) an amount sufficiently
large so that only a 0.01 probability remains that the actual claims
amount would exceed the estimate.
Determining this 0.01 point requires a probability distribution for
the number of claims. For this purpose, the Supervisory Service uses
the Poisson distribution which has been used in mathematical descrip-
tions of a great variety of phenomena in which discrete events occur
randomly and independently.' As applied to claims, the Poisson dis-
tribution defines the probability of the occurrence of any given number
on the assumption that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of claims up to
a certain point in time does not alter the probability that additional
claims will be made thereafter. One may object that this assumption
is not realistic in the insurance context because the occurrence of claims
in the beginning of a year may indicate a greater probability that more
of the same type are to follow. A model could be constructed on this
basis," but the Service prefers to use the Poisson distribution and to
account for a "contagion" of claims as a change in the basic probabilities
by the method previously described. 7  To simplify computations, a
table for applying the Poisson model is furnished by the Supervisory
Service.
The consequences of the safe bound formula may be summarized
as follows. There is somewhat less than a 0.01 chance that underlying
105 The distribution of telephone calls coming into a switchboard is a frequently
used example. See 1 W. FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS
APPLicATIONs 413-21 (2d ed. 1957).
86 The Polya model. See Porn, supra note 47, at 4-17.
67 In these computations, earned premiums are premium payments plus (or minus)
the net change in the reserve for unearned premiums. Similarly, incurred losses
are losses paid plus (or minus) the net change in the reserve for unpaid losses. The
premiums received and the losses paid are assumed to have been received and paid
evenly throughout the year. The changes in the reserves are computed as if they
occurred at midyear, and an annual interest factor of 5% is applied to bring them
to that point. (This is done by multiplying the reserve at the close of the preceding
year by V'L0 and the reserve at the close of the year by 1/V-1.05. See COMPuTA-
TION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 8-9.) The 5% figure was chosen as a conservative
estimate of a company's earnings on its investments. Since the net earned premium
and the reserve requirements are thus both computed as of the middle of the year,
both these quantities are multiplied by an interest factor (1/V1.05) to give the
amounts required for the beginning of the year. Thus, at the beginning of a year,
reserves must not be less than (1/V1.05 ) (My[v]--P) where the symbols have the
meaning given in note 78 infra.
1971]
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conditions affecting claims in any line of insurance would so change
that the expected claims in that line would exceed the amount computed
as expected for a bad year. The probability that all lines would
simultaneously have such a bad year is far less than 0.01. In the
extraordinary year which is simultaneously bad in all lines, the chance
that claims would exceed the required reserves is less than 0.01. The
0.01 probability is based on the assumption that claims in the various
lines are independent; to the extent that they are correlated the prob-
ability of excess claims in the extraordinary bad year would be greater
than 0.01. As this statement indicates, the model is not so precise or
so fully statistically supported that the degree of risk can be appraised
with certainty. The model does, however, give some benchmarks for
this risk, and one is able to say with some conviction that it is very
small.
D. "Exact" Computations
When reserves lie outside the safe bound limits, a company must
either increase its reinsurance if reserves are inadequate, or write addi-
tional policies or reduce reinsurance if reserves are excessive. But
before the former is necessary it may make more exact computations
to determine whether the theoretical requirements have been met. The
method of computation has not been prescribed by the Supervisory
Service, but a manual written by the Central Association of Finnish
Insurance Companies describes methods which have the informal ap-
proval of the Service."
Since claims may be made in any amount within policy limits, each
claim size has a certain probability associated with it. In the more
exact computations these probabilities are considered and are deter-
mined from historical statistics of the distribution of claim sizes in the
same line of insurance. The Finnish Statistical Center for Nonlife
Insurance has collected such statistics from a variety of sources, and
from them computed the probabilities of different amounts of claims
for different lines on an industrywide basis. For example, in private
accident insurance, these statistics show that there is about a 0.50 prob-
ability that a claim will be ten dollars or less and a 0.99 probability
that it will be approximately 887 dollars or less.6 9
In computing these probabilities, the basic difficulty encountered
was that no very large claims were made, thus making it impossible on
the basis of experience to determine their probability. The Statistical
Center observed, however, that when probability was graphed against
68 COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56.
69 Id. (appendix 2).
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claim size on logarithmic paper, the lines were almost straight. It
therefore argued that in the absence of other evidence the probabilities
for larger claims could be estimated graphically by extending the lines.
The Supervisory Service accepts this method of estimation because it
appears to be reasonable and attributes a greater probability to large
claims than almost any other plausible assumption involving the
hypothesis that the probability of a claim decreases as its size increases.
In fact, although this assumption is important in theoretical calculations,
it is less significant in practice because reinsurance cuts off most of
these very large potential claims."0 The Supervisory Service will accept
a company's calculations based on the industry-wide probability dis-
tributions of a single claim, unless substantial reasons exist for
believing that the shape of the claim distribution of the company is
significantly different from that of the industry. This might occur if a
company accepted groups of risks uniformly more dangerous or larger
compared to its mean risk than was common in the industry.
Determining the probability distribution of total claims in all lines
of insurance based on the probability distribution of individual claims
presents a formidable calculation problem arising from the fact that
any given total can result from a huge number of combinations of
single claims. If there were 10,000 individual claims-not an unreason-
able figure for a significant company-the required computations would
be unvieldy and uneconomic even for modern computers.
Fortunately, ways of approximating these probabilities are known.
In 1965, at the time the requirements for a minimum equalization
reserve were established, companies making the exact calculation used
the so-called Monte Carlo technique."' In this method a computer,
using an input of random numbers and the probability distribution of a
single claim, simulates the occurrence of claims and computes the total
amount of claims a large number of times. The 0.01 probability point
is then determined from the sample total of claims thus computed.
70 When safe bound computations are made, reinsurance of this type (excess of
loss) is accounted for by considering only the maximum risk retained by the company.
COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 6, 20. When exact methods are used the
problem of accounting for such reinsurance is slightly more difficult because the
values of the components of the formulas depend on the probability distribution of
a single claim and they change when the probability distribution is changed by the
elimination of large claims. To facilitate computation, the Computation Manual
provides practical tables giving values of the formula components for a broad range
of net retentions. Id. (appendix 3).
Particular difficulties arise in the case of quota share reinsurance when the
proportion of the policies insured varies. Some companies have assumed, when com-
puting the minimum required reserves, that the reinsurance level is uniformly equal to
the minimum proportion reinsured, and have made the converse assumption in com-
puting the maximum permitted reserves. Less draconian solutions to these com-
plexities are still being explored.
71 Id. 4.
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More recently, the Supervisory Service has approved an extremely simple
formula known as the normal power approximation which is sufficiently
accurate unless the company has a disproportionate number of high risk
policies. 2 The Service permits the normal power approximation to be
used if the maximum single retained risk is less than twice the standard
deviation of the total amount of claims.1 3 In only one case has
a company failed to meet this criterion.74 As in the case of the safe
bound approximation, this method assumes that claims in the various
lines are independent; to the extent they are correlated the risk of in-
solvency will be larger than that computed.
III. RISK ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK RULES
Solvency controls represent a balancing of risks of insolvency
against the burdens and anticompetitive effect of required reserves.
Every control, explicitly or implicitly, embodies some risk policy. This
section uses the Finnish methods to appraise the risk policies implicit in
New York's statutory minimum capital requirements and in its two-to-
one and one-to-one administrative rules.
72A derivation of the normal power approximation may be found in P. BEARD,
T. PENTI.KINEN & E. PESONEN, RIss THEORY 43-47 (1969). Its accuracy is dis-
cussed and numerical examples given in Pesonen, NP-Approximation of Risk Proc-
esses, SKANDINAVISK AXTUARIETIDSKRIFT 158 (1968). Instructions for using this
approximation which have the informal approval of the Supervisory Service may be
found in COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 5-9. A published, slightly different
version appears in Hovinen, Procedures and Basic Statistics to be Used in Magnitude
Control of Equalisation Reserves in Finland, 5 THE AsTIN BULLETIN 227 (1969).
Using the normal power approximation as in the Computation Manual, the
minimum working capital required under the Finnish rules at the beginning of a year
is given by:
U - V -1. qP+ya+- - (y2 - 1)
Substituting the values for yo.01, we have:
U = .976qp + 2 .2 7 a + 7.17 -
a2
See COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 9. Each term of this expression is the
sum of the indicated quantity for all lines of insurance. The first term, qp, represents
the excess of expected losses in a bad year over those in a normal year. The second
term, ya, is the number of standard deviations necessary to provide a safety margin
(here 0.01). The third term adds an amount to account for the fact that the dis-
tribution does not die away symmetrically in both tails, but has greater area, or
13
probability, in the right tail. The factor - is a measure of the skewness multipliedG2
by the standard deviation of that distribution.
73 COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 7. The technical condition is that
the measure of skewness referred to in the preceding note must be less than 2.0.
3 COMPUTATION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 7.
74 Interview with Dr. Erkki Pesonen, Director of the Dep't of Insurance, Finnish
Ministry for Social Affairs, in Helsinki, June 1970.
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Following the Finnish model, we may view a regulatory authority
as making separate policy decisions concerning respectively the scope
and the degree of protection from risk. The scope of protection is
the extent to which provision is made for changes in basic conditions
affecting risks. In the Finnish model, questions of this sort were
resolved by making a bad year allowance for each line of insurance,
determined from past statistics of abnormal variations of claims in that
line.7" A twenty percent allowance for a line means that in a bad year
expected claims would be twenty percent greater than in the current
year. In determining these bad year factors, the Service omitted ex-
tremely abnormal years, such as those involving major wars or economic
depressions, on the ground that protection from such abnormalities was
not worth the cost. Presumably bad year factors based on domestic
statistics would be different from the Finnish factors, and the difference
might be substantial if regulatory authorities here adopted different
policies with respect to the remoteness of the risks considered. 76
The second policy decision is the degree of protection from fluctua-
tion in claims that occurs under the conditions assumed to exist. In
the Finnish model, the Supervisory Service assumed the conditions of
the hypothetical bad year and permitted a fluctuation risk 7 of 0.01,
thus allowing a risk of one in a hundred that in such a year claims
would exceed the amounts reserved. Obviously, the 0.01 choice was
arbitrary, probably more reflective of a cutoff point commonly used by
statisticians in testing hypotheses than a special choice relating to insur-
ance. The risk that claims will in fact exceed the reserves is far
smaller than 0.01 since there is only a small probability that the bad
year situation would be realized in any line and a much smaller prob-
ability that it would be simultaneously realized in all lines.
The use of separate bad year and fluctuation risk factors in effect
divides variations in claims into two segments. Mathematically, any
given reserve could be the result of different combinations of bad year
and fluctuation risk factors which work in opposite directions: the
greater the allowance for bad years, the smaller the fluctuation risk, and
conversely. Since the New York rules do not specify either risk factor,
we must relate each rule to pairs of values, each pair being equivalent in
total risk to the rule being tested.
75 An abnormal fluctuation was defined as one that would not occur within a
0.01 probability assuming that current premium rates represented expected losses.
The allowance is the percentage by which current expected losses would have to be
increased so that losses in the bad year could have occurred within a 0.01 probability.
760 Other things being equal, one might expect bad year factors to be smaller
for United States companies due to their much greater size.
77 The fluctuation risk is the probability that the total claims amount will exceed
the amounts reserved.
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In computing these effective policies, the "exact" method of the
Finnish system cannot be used since it depends on the probability
distribution of claims derived from Finnish statistics, and we have no
assurance that the probability distribution of domestic claims would be
similar. The safe bound approximation, however, does not depend
upon any particular situation or characteristic of Finnish companies, but
only on the general assumption that claims are random and, to a degree,
independent events. There is no reason to believe the claims process
on this basic level is different in the United States. Table I, which
follows, is based on the safe bound approximation as applied to estab-
lished companies-those not experiencing significant growth-whose
earned premiums may be taken to equal their written premiums. It
pairs the values for the bad year factors and the fluctuation risks that
would lead to the same reserves as the two-to-one rule, assuming a
maximum single net retention equal to the New York limit, ten percent
of policyholders' surplus.
TABLE 1 7
RISK EQUIVALENTS OF THE TWO-TO-ONE
RULE (ESTABLISHED COMPANIES)
Bad year factors ........ 0 0.10 10.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Fluctuation risk 4 . 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
78 The probabilities shown in Table I are from E. MOLINA, PoIssoN's EXPoNEN-
TI.AL BINOMIAL Limrr (1942) (table II). A 50% loss ratio (losses to earned pre-
miums) has been assumed.
A sample calculation is set out below. Let:
p = net premium income carried during the year = expected claims amount for
the year (by assumption),
M = maximum single net retained risk,
q = bad year factor,
U =surplus to policyholders at the beginning of the year, and
y. [ v ] = the number of claims, such that, assuming a Poisson process with v as
the expected number of claims, there is an a probability that the number of
claims will equal or exceed this number.
In the Finnish system,
(1 + q)p
(1) v =- (GENERAL LETTER, supra note 49, at 2). v is rounded upwards
M
to the next number appearing in tabulations of the Poisson distribution.
The Finnish safe bound rule is:
11' 1.
U>Max 0,_ (my. Iv ] -p)
V 1.05
See Porn, supra note 47, at 15. The minimum permissible U is defined by the equality
portion of the equation, yielding:
1
U=- (My,[v]-p) or,
V 1.05
U + .976p =.976My [I v.
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For established companies whose largest single risk is equal to the
legal maximum, Table I shows that the two-to-one rule is equivalent,
at one extreme, to the assumption of no change in basic conditions in
a bad year and a fluctuation risk of 0.002. At the other extreme, ex-
pected claims in a bad year are assumed to increase by fifty percent and
the two-to-one rule is equivalent to a 0.08 fluctuation risk. If the 0.01
fluctuation risk used in Finland is accepted, the table shows that the
two-to-one rule in effect assumes that expected claims in a bad year
would increase by about twenty percent, a value at the bottom of the
range actually computed by the Finns. This suggests that for an estab-
lished company with a maximum net retention equal to the legal maxi-
mum, the two-to-one rule would probably be consistent with reasonable
values for both parameters.
The one-to-one rule was adopted for fire insurance because of the
possibility of greater fluctuations of claims in that line. The Finnish
method provides a way of appraising this choice.
TABLE II80
RISK EQUIVALENTS OF THE ONE-TO-ONE
RULE (ESTABLISHED COMPANIES)
Bad year factors ........ .. 0 020 0.40 0.70
Fluctuation risk ......... 0.00007 0.0005 0.002 0.01
The shift in policy on claim fluctuations represented by the one-
to-one rule may be analyzed by comparing the bad year allowances in
Using (1),
(2) U + .976p= .976My= (1 M
In New York, the 2-to-1 rule dictates that net written premiums shall not exceed
twice policyholders' surplus (U). Assuming that during the year net premium income
(p) is one-half of net written premiums, as previously stated, and that written pre-
miums are equal to earned premiums, we have U = p. Assuming that the maximum
permitted single net retained risk is insured, M = 0.1U = 0.1p. Therefore,
F(1 + q)p
(3) 1.976p=.976( .1 [ ]
or, 20.24=y , [10(1 + q)].
Assume q = .20 and the result is
20.24=y. [12].
Using tables of the Poisson distribution for an expected value of 12, we find that the
probability of 21 or more claims (the point of ruin) is 0.012 as shown in the table
(rounded to 0.01).
79 Fluctuation risk is defined in note 77 supra.
80 Same source and assumption as in Table L See note 78 supra. The figures
in Table II may be derived from the sample calculation given for Table I by setting
U = 2p in equation (3) of note 78 supra.
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Tables I and II for the same fluctuation risk. Thus a 0.01 risk under
the two-to-one rule has about a twenty percent bad year allowance
associated with it, while the same risk under the one-to-one rule
corresponds to about a seventy percent allowance. The one-to-one rule
for fire insurance thus embodies the assumption that fluctuations in fire
claims arising from changes in basic conditions are about three and
one-half times greater than plausible average bad year allowances for
other lines. 1
Although data is lacking for the United States, the Finnish studies
indicate that fire claim fluctuation is much closer to fluctuation in other
lines than is indicated by this relation between the New York rules;
probably it is not twice the average for other lines.8s Even assuming
it to be twice this average, a 0.01 fluctuation risk would lead to ap-
proximately a three-to-two rule for fire insurance, or a one-third re-
duction in the amounts currently required.
Although the two-to-one rule may be defensible for established
companies insuring the legal maximum single risk, it represents a much
more stringent policy for companies electing not to compete for the
largest contracts. This is because the rules are not correlated with the
size distribution of potential claims, but only with their total amount
as reflected in written premiums. In the safe bound method, the largest
single risk is used as a surrogate for the probability distribution of claim
sizes, and so the risk policy represented by the two-to-one rule changes
with the size of that largest risk.
TABLE 111 83
RISK EQUIVALENTS OF THE TWO-To-ONE
RULE (ESTABLISHED COMPANIES)
Bad year
factors 1 0 0.10 0.20 1 0.30 1 0.40 1 0.50
Fluctuation
risks when
MNR * equals:
1% 84 0 85 0 0 0 0.000003 0.00002
5% .00003 .0002 .001 .004 .01 .03
10% .002 .005 .01 .03 .05 .08
* Maximum single net retained risk as percent of surplus to policy-
holders.
81The multiple would be larger for smaller values of q, and smaller for larger
values, although in the latter case, the assumed q value for the fire line would have to
become so large as to be unreasonable.
82The bad year factor for fire insurance is 0.40 in the Finnish system, while the
smallest factor is 0.20. GENERAL LETTER, supra note 49, at 12.
83 Same source and assumption as in Table I. See note 78 stepra. The 10%o line
of Table III is taken directly from Table I. The 5% line may be derived by setting
M=0.05p in equation (3) of note 78 supra. The 1% line may be derived by setting
M=0.01p in equation (3) of note 78 supra.
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The preceding table shows, for example, that allowing twenty
percent for a bad year, a company with a legal maximum single risk
(ten percent of policyholders' surplus) has a fluctuation risk of about
0.01; if the largest single risk is half of the maximum, the fluctuation
risk is about 0.001; if a tenth of the maximum, the fluctuation risk is
less than one in a million. Similar disparities appear in the full range
of bad year factors.
The lack of consistency means that the two-to-one rule, or any
rule based solely on a multiple of premiums, cannot be sustained in
general as a reasonable accommodation between the risk of insolvency
and the burden of reserves. If the rule is correct for companies at the
legal limit for their largest single risk, it must be excessive as to others,
and for some, vastly so."8 If it is correct for those companies with
smaller maximum single risks, it is inadequate for those insuring the
legal maximum.
Probably the most important consequence of the New York rules
is the burden they impose on entering and growing companies. New
York's statutory fixed minimum capital requirements have their prin-
cipal effect on entering companies because the administrative rules will
require reserves greater than the statutory reserves as a company's
premium writings grow much past $4 millionY7 Beneath this premium
level, statutory discrimination against smaller companies exists because
statutorily required reserves will usually lie between $1 million and $2
million and this will exceed the amounts required even under the one-
to-one rule for companies with less than $1 million in written premiums.
This distinct treatment of smaller companies-requiring reserves which
bear a larger proportion to written premiums-may be advanced on the
ground that smaller companies are likely to be subject to greater claim
fluctuations than larger companies. To test the extent to which larger
proportions of reserves could be justified on this basis, consider the
situation if $1 million is required as permanent capital. Expendable
capital for start-up costs and permanent capital for liquidation expenses
84 These entries were calculated using the normal approximation to the Poisson
distribution. For large expected values, the Poisson distribution approaches the
normal distribution. The figures are from NATL BUREAU OF STANDARDs, TABLES or
NORMALs PRoBABiLrrY FuNcTions (1953).
85 Zero entries indicate a probability of less than 0.000001.
88 The theoretical conclusion that the 2-to-1 rule requires excessive resources is
supported by a recent statistical study showing that for most lines of insurance, the
industry-wide average of claims is less than 50% of the average net premium writings.
Hofflander, Minimum Capital and Surphlu Requirements for Multiple Line Inmsratce
Companies: A New Approach, in INsmuRNcE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY:
STUDIES ix INsURANCE REGULATIOx 69, 82-86 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969)
(table 2).
87 See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
754 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.119:730
are deemed covered by separate amounts. Using the safe bound ap-
proximation, and assuming that the maximum single net retained risk
is ten percent of surplus, the fluctuation risks are given in Table IV.
TABLE IV8s
FLUCTUATION RISKS ASSUMING $1 IILLION
IN REQUIRED SURPLUS
Bad year factor: 1 0 [ 0.10 j 0.20 1 0.30 1 0.40 1 0.50
Fluctuation risk when
net written premiums
equal ($1,000):
100s9 0 0 0 0 0 0
250 0 0 0 0 0 0
500 .000002 .000008 .00002 .00004 .00008 .0002
750 .00005 .0001 .0003 .0006 .001 .002
1,000 .00007 .0002 .0005 .001 1 .002 .005
The table shows that for companies with written premiums up to
$1 million the risk of the total claims amount exceeding the statutorily
required reserves is far smaller than under the two-to-one rule if that
were applied solely to a larger company. The statutory rules thus
represent for entering and small companies a significantly more stringent
risk policy, which cannot be justified by reference to the possibility of
greater fluctuations in claims.
As a company grows, it needs a greater absolute reserve due to
increased expected losses. These losses for the coming year are gen-
erally estimated by multiplying the earned premiums for the preceding
year (the portion of the written premium allocated to that year) by an
average loss ratio (losses to earned premiums averaged over a number
of recent years). Clearly the written premium, if different from the
earned premium, would not be correct in this computation. Since the
New York rules use written premiums, and since for a growing com-
pany written premiums exceed earned premiums, these rules overstate
the increase in reserves required to cover growth. We measure the
overstatement by comparing the reserves a growing company is re-
quired to add under the safe bound rules as a percentage of the required
additions under the two-to-one rule. To make the comparison we
assume a maximum net retention of ten percent of surplus and that the
increase in earned premiums is one-third the increase in written pre-
8 8 Same source and assumption as in Table I. See note 78 supra. For the first
entry of Table IV, set p=0.1U in equation (3) of note 78 supra. Then p =0.05U
and M=2p in the same equation. These figures are then used in equation (3) of
note 78 supra. Similar calculations yield the rest of Table IV.
89 Zero entries indicate a probability of less than 0.000001.
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miums. Setting 0.01 as a reasonable fluctuation risk, Table V shows
the percentage relationships.
TABLE V
INCREASE IN SAFE BOUND RESERVES AS A PERCENTAGE
OF INCREASE IN TWO-TO-ONE RESERVES
Bad year factors 0 0.10 1 0.20 1 0.30 0.40 1 0.50
Percentage relationship ... I 22% 31% 140% 49% 0.57% 651
The table indicates that additions to reserves at the rate of between
one-fifth and two-thirds the rate required by the two-to-one rule would
preserve a consistent margin of safety in a growth situation; looking at
the matter another way, under one set of assumptions, if the fluctuation
risk under the two-to-one rule for an established company is 0.01, the
risk for a company whose written premiums have increased by thirty
percent over the preceding year would be 0.008; if the increase were
150 percent, the risk would be 0.001."° Written premium rules thus
impose an excessive burden on growing companies, the extent of that
burden depending on the rate of growth.
The burden of the requirements on growing companies is com-
pounded by the method of accounting for unearned premiums. Assume
that the expenses of writing an additional $100 in premiums are $40,
that expected loss claims over three years are $50, and that a third
of the written premium is earned in the current year and the balance
deferred by crediting the unearned premium reserve. Under current
accounting practice, the company deducts the entire $40 as a current
expense, deducts $17 in loss claims, and carries the unearned premium
reserve as a liability. The difference between the net increase in assets
($43) and the increase in liabilities ($67) reduces policyholders'
surplus by $24. This depletion would be reversed in subsequent years
when the balance of the premium is earned without additional charge.
But since growing companies have a disproportionate number of first
year policies, they continually drain policyholders' surplus in building
up a prepaid expense equity in unearned premiums, a process which
continues until the rate of growth declines. Meanwhile, the require-
ments of the administrative rules must be satisfied. Thus, in the above
example, an additional policyholders' surplus of $74 would be required
to fund the increase of $100 in premium writings.
Since most rapidly growing companies do not have sufficient
surplus to meet the requirements of the New York rules, they use
1o To separate out effects it has been assumed in the above figures that the
maximum single net retention grows with the company, always remaining at the legal
maximum. If this were not true, disparities between the growth and established
companies would be substantially greater than as stated.
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reinsurance to finance premium growth. The company pays to the
reinsurer the proportion of the gross premium equal to the reinsurer's
proportion of the risk assumed; the reinsurer pays to the company a
commission in an amount such that the net premium retained by the
reinsurer is sufficient to cover its portion of the expected loss claim plus
expenses and profit. The company's net written premium is thus re-
duced, while its surplus benefits from substituting a current commission,
which increases surplus, for later-accruing premiums, which are carried
as a liability. By reinsurance, the company in effect borrows policy-
holders' surplus against its prepaid expense equity in unearned
premiums."1
If the company in the above example reinsures half the $100
policy, it would give up half the earned and unearned premiums in
return for, say, a $21 commission from the reinsurer and the re-
insurer's assumption of half the claim loss. During the first year, the
company's financial statement would show $50 in net written premiums
and $21 in commission income against $40 in expenses, $8 in loss
claims, and a $33 increase in unearned premium liability, for a net
decrease in surplus of $10. Reserves required to finance this $100
growth would thus be $35 ($25 to cover the $50 increase in net written
premiums and $10 to cover depletion of surplus). Under risk theoretic
rules, assuming the risk standards of the two-to-one rule as set forth
in Table I, the required reserves would be only slightly larger-some
$41-and the company would not have the net $4 cost of reinsurance
($29 reinsurance premium less $25 loss claim assumed by the re-
insurer). The example illustrates that by reducing the reserves re-
quired for growth, even safe bound risk theoretic methods should per-
mit substantial savings in reinsurance premiums.
IV. CONCLUSION
Risk theoretic analysis reveals significant defects in New York's
solvency control rules. The New York statutes impose unnecessary
burdens on entering and very small companies because they require
fixed dollar amounts of capital without reference to premium income
or other measures of expected losses. The Department of Insurance's
administrative rules based on written premiums discriminate against
companies not competing for the largest policies and against those in
rapid growth: the first because the rules ignore the size distributions
of retained risks, and the second because they make no allowance for
the lag between earned and written premiums. Entering companies are
9 1 For a discussion, see 1 MUNICH REINSURANICE Co., REINSURANCE AND RE-
ASSURANCE 3-8 (1963).
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also at a disadvantage compared to established companies because of
the Department's previously mentioned policy of relaxing the adminis-
trative rules in favor of companies with a history of profitable op-
erations. 2 While this may be justifiable in terms of solvency protec-
tion, the discrimination against new entrants emphasizes that the stated
rules should be no stricter than solvency considerations would dictate
when underwriting skill has yet to be established. The special burden
of the present rules on entering and growing companies may have an
unnecessary chilling effect on competition and on expansion of industry
capacity.
This much is deducible from, or at least suggested by, theoretical
considerations without reference to empirical data. If some reason-
able assumptions are made concerning claim statistics, it appears that
the two-to-one rule may not be overly stringent in all situations, but
that the one-to-one rule probably represents an extreme view of the
extent of fluctuation in fire and marine claims. A definitive judgment
as to the acceptability of these rules, however, would have to await study
of claim materials and decision on risk policies.
If the Finnish experience is a fair guide, the introduction of risk
theoretic rules should most significantly affect reinsurance practices.
By reducing reserve requirements, total reinsurance should be reduced.
In Finland, reinsurance premiums as a percentage of total premiums
for fire insurance declined from about fifty percent when the equalization
reserve was introduced in 1953 to about thirty-three percent in 1957;
the figures for transport insurance were about seventy percent and
fifty-eight percent, respectively.93 Further declines may occur as the
full impact of the changes made in 1965 is realized. Under rating
systems commonly used in the United States, the cost of reinsurance is
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher premium rates. Con-
sequently, if comparable reductions in reinsurance were effected here,
there should be substantial savings for consumers, particularly in the
case of rapidly growing companies.
In defining more precisely and persuasively the reserves actually
required for solvency, risk theoretic methods should throw into sharp
92 Text accompanying note 20 supra.
9 3 See Pentikidinen, Fluctuation Reserve: A Technique to Take Into Account the
Fluctuation of the Risk Business When Calculating the Technical Reserves of Inmr-
ance Companies, 1970 INs. I N FiNLAND, No. 1, at 3, 7.
9 4 Reinsurance premiums paid by a company will normally exceed the losses paid
by the reinsurer. As a result, a reinsurance program will increase the loss ratio
(the ratio of net losses paid by the company to net premiums retained by the company
after deduction of payments to reinsurers). Since overall premium rates are com-
monly set so that, after deduction of expenses and an allowance for profit, the remain-
ing proportion of premium dollar equals the loss ratio (averaged over several recent
years), an increase in the loss ratio leads directly to an increase in rates.
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relief the propriety of present practices by which policyholders bear the
-total cost of reinsurance. This issue has not arisen in Finland probably
because Finnish companies lack the extensive resources of American
companies. But since free reserves of companies here are extensive and
are frequently used in acquisition programs through conglomerates-to
the benefit of stockholders-it seems reasonable for policyholders to
carry only that portion of reinsurance costs needed to protect solvency,
while reinsurance costs above that level should not be considered in
setting premium ratesf 5
When mathematical methods are used in the law, the fear is some-
times expressed that with some mathematical twist or seemingly
innocent shift in input, the cognoscenti can manipulate the techniques
for their benefit. In constructing their regulations, the Finns were
concerned with the problem of technicality, but from a different point
of view. The regulators promoted risk theoretic methods but, to
facilitate compliance, sought techniques that could easily be applied,
even by those who did not understand them. In fact, the essence of the
Finnish method is not the application of computer techniques to the
problem of solvency control, but the distillation of very simple rules
from a highly complicated and technical branch of probability theory.
The safe bound methods applicable to the great majority of com-
panies are so simple, and their basis so clearly revealed, that manipula-
tion is difficult to envision short of simple fraud in reporting, a risk
under any system. When "exact" methods are required, companies
will usually use the normal power approximation; this would require a
computer except that prepared tables reduce the computation to a
trivial matter of substitution in a formula. In the exceptional cases
governed by neither the safe bound rules nor the normal power ap-
proximation, the computation is more complex. The failure, however,
to satisfy requirements of more simple methods means that the company
is much closer to danger and its status deserves more careful con-
sideration. By sharpening the focus of regulatory concern, risk
theoretic methods should reduce the opportunities for manipulation,
even in the exceptional case where the level of technicality is substantial.
It may be objected that the Finnish method does not yield an
accurate measure of the fluctuation risk and does not in fact even
purport to do so. This is true. The use of safe bound assumptions at
several points means that the computed risk is overstated, but the degree
of overstatement cannot be estimated without complicated effort. More-
05 Cf. Hearings on Leasco Data Processing Corp. Before the House Antitrust
Subcomnm. of the House Comn. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23, pt. 2,
at 32 (1970) (remarks of Representative Celler).
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over, as we have observed, making allowances for bad years precludes
a precise specification of risk, even assuming no overstatement in the
methods of approximation. Greater precision is attainable in theory
but would require more data and more complex calculations.
The Finns in fact made a decision common in the law: they traded
precision of result for certainty and simplicity in application. It should
be noted, however, that the formal regulations merely require that
mathematical methods be used to compute reserves sufficient to keep the
fluctuation risk under 0.01. The technique by which this is done is
left open, and a company may use methods different from those sug-
gested if it can demonstrate that accuracy would be improved by the
substitution. Thus the basic regulatory decision was to require a
mathematical approach to the problem of solvency and a specification
of the degree of acceptable risk. Within this framework, the methods of
computation can become as accurate as the companies undertake to
make them. Meanwhile, the public interest is protected by "safe"
methods.
The fluctuation risk is not of course the only threat to solvency.
There are many others, but probably the most frequently discussed is
the danger of investment losses from declines in the securities markets.
This problem is less visible in Finland where insurance companies
invest principally in debt and do not have the common stock portfolios
which are held by American companies and subject to much greater
fluctuations in value.
But this problem was recognized in Finland, and by omitting it
from mathematical consideration the Finns in effect treated market
fluctuation as a problem distinct from claims fluctuation. This seems
correct: the extent of market risk depends on the nature of the invest-
ment portfolio and other factors relatively unrelated to claims risk. 6
To squeeze both market and claims risks under a single written premium
rule implies that regulation cannot in any realistic sense rest on an
informed judgment as to the degree of danger from each source. It is
generally accepted that protection from investment losses calls for a
conservative valuation of portfolio securities, and there would be no
conflict between the use of a conservative rule in this valuation and the
simultaneous use of risk theoretic methods to estimate the fluctuation
risk.9"
96A study has shown that claims losses and return on investment are in fact
independent phenomena. See Lambert & Hofflander, The Impact of New Multiple
Line Underwriting on Investment Portfolios of Property-Liability Imvirers, 33 J. Risr,
& INs. 209-33 (1966).
97An appropriate rule could be built on statistics of variations in securities prices.
See Hofflander, Minimum Capital and Surphs Requirements for Multiple Line Insur-
ance Companies: A New Approach, in INsuRAiNcE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY:
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To what extent does the Finnish method depend on particular
conditions, not likely to be duplicated in a different regulatory setting?
The exact method depends on the probability distribution of claim sizes,
and this must reflect claim statistics. It is, however, a mathematical
fact that differences in the shapes of these distributions within the range
encountered in practice will not change the results by much. And, as
previously noted, the safe bound methods applicable to most companies
use the maximum claim as a safe approximation for the distribution
function of claim sizes, and thus are not to any extent dependent on the
shape of those distributions or on the parochial claim experiences
underlying them. Of course, the bad year factors must be set, and the
policy decisions there involved should be predicated upon the experience
of variations in claims. But because the factors being measured are to
reflect abnormalities, a frequent updating of the experience would not
seem necessary; and requiring the regulatory authority to take
systematic cognizance of its experience from time to time is not unduly
onerous. Indeed, the present two-to-one and one-to-one rules represent
just such an intuitive appreciation of experience in the 1930's.
If it had been necessary to compute exact probabilities of ruin in
Finland, the objective of simplicity could not have been achieved. But
this was not necessary; to avoid complexities which might introduce
errors, the model builders chose safe approximations as simplifying
assumptions at various points in the method. No one knows how
much was denied to accuracy in these choices. It is nevertheless strik-
ing that despite compromises with perfection the results read so strongly
on rules formed by educated intuition.
STUDIEs IN INSURANCE REGULATION 69 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
A theoretical development appears in ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., PRICES AND PROFITS
IN THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY E-8 (1967) (a report to the
American Insurance Association).
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